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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
Parson Asphalt Products, Inc.,
regarding special fuel tax
liability for the years of
October 1973 to September
1976, before the Utah State
Tax CoITu'lli s s ion

Case No.

16797

NATURE OF THE CASE
The Utah State Tax. Commission, after a hearing, affirmed
the assessment of the special fuel tax against Parson Asphalt
Products, Inc.,

(Respondent herein) in the sum of $16, 711. 94,

plus interest and penalties.

Respondent appealed and

petitioned review to the Second Judicial District Court in
and for the County of Weber, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION Of THE CASE IN THE LOWER pOURT_
After a trial de ngyo, Judge John F. Wahlquist, presidiqg
without a jury, issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law and Order, Judgment and Decree ruling that the fuel
used by Petitioner for and during the reconstruction of
State Highway 127, known as the road to Antelope Island, was
exempt from the special fuel tax and set aside the decision
and order of the State Tax Commission.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEA.L
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the lower
court affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In addition to the facts recited in the stipulation
the trial court heard the testimony of Mont Wilson, engineer for Respondent, received into evidence documentary
evidence by way of an exhibit which showed amounts spent
and work·done on this road since.its designation in 1965,
and reviewed the transcript of the hearing held before the
State Tax Commission.
The original design of the road was inadequate.

It

was too narrow and the sides were too steep and was therefore subject to erosion due to wind and water action.

As

a result of the erosion the road washed out annually,
(R 71, 72) and was under water for 4 to 6 months at a time.
It was not substantial enough to remain generaly open for
public traffic.· (R 69)
The State expended about $25,000.00 per year commencing
in 1976, to maintain the road and in addition contracted
for extensive repairs with private contractors in 1965,
1968, 1969, 1979, 1971, 1972 and 1973.

(Exhibit lP)

However, the annual washouts continued until the road
was redesigned and rebuilt by Respondent pursuant to contract in 1973.

(R 78)

The new road was significantly different from the old
one.

It was much wider having a subbase in :some areas as

wide as 220 feet.

It had a different side slope design in

that they were very flat

(beach slopes) so that the wave
-2-
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action would not cause it to erode.

(R 75)

Since the reconstruction the road has not washed out.
(R 78)

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT WAS NOT LIMITED TO ':j:'HE
11

ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS 19 ST A..N'DARD OF
REVIErv.

Appellant argues that since U.C.A. 41-11-50 provides
for an exemption from the fuel tax in those
the purchasers or users of

speci~l

c~ses

where

fuel shall establish

to the satisfaction of the Corrunissiqn that they are entitled
to the exemption, the Commission's decision spould not be
set aside unless it acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or
capriciously.

This argument ignores the plaip language

of the applicable statutes.

u.c.~.

59-24-3(1) provides:

All appeals from and petitions for review of
decisions of the State Tax Commission brpuqht before
the tax division of any district court shall be
original, independent proceedings and shall be
1
tried without jury and de nova.
U.C.A. 59-24-4 adds that:
. In proceedings of the tax division of any.
district court and on appeal therefrom, a prepqnderance of the evidence shall suffice to sus~
tqin the burden of proof. . . . ·
Under these statutes, the instant proceedings should be independent and de nova with a preponderance of evidence sufficient
to sustain the burden of proof.

Therefore, the trial court

- 3--
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was not limited to the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
of review but should make a fresh examination of the issues.
POINT II
THE ROAD TO ANTELOPE ISLAND WAS NOT A
"HIGHWAY" UNDER THE UTAH USE FUEL TAX ACT.
The centra1 issue in this case is whether the road to
Antelope Island qualifies as a "highway" under the Utah Use
Fuel Tax Act (the "A9t"), U.C.A.
does not, the~ Respondent is

41-11-48, et seq.

If the road

exempt from the fuel tax by

the operation of U.C.A. 41-11-50.

This statute provides

in part:
A tax is hereby imposed at the rate of seven
cents* per gallon on the sale or use of special
fuel, provided that the sale or use of special fuel
for any purpose other than to operate or propel a
motor vehicle upon the public highways of Utah shall
be exempt from application of this tax. . . .
Thu§>, if the instant road was not a "highway" under the Act,
l-1

Respondent qualifies for the exemption.
As support for its argument that the instant road was
a "highway," the Appellant invokes the definition of "public
highway" froro U.C.A. 27-12-2(8).

It would be inappropriate,

however, to apply a definition from Title 27 to a matter
involving the Utah Use Fuel Tax Act in Title 41 when the
Act contains its own definition of "highway." U.C.A. 41-ll-49(c)
provides:

*By a recent amendment, the tax rate has been changed
to nine cents per gallon, but this change does not affect
this case.
-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Highway shall mean and include every way or· place,
of whatever nature, generally open to the use of the
public for the purpose of vehicular travel notwithstanding that the same may be temporarily closed for
the purpose of conptruction, reconstruction, maintenance
or repair.
Since the Act contains its own· definition of "highway,"
it· would be inappropriate to resort to a definition outside
the Act.

This is partipularly true where the definition from

Title 27 is limited in application to Chapters 12 and 13 of
the Title:

U.C.A. 27-12-2 provides:

12 and 13 of this title:

"As used in chapters

(8) Public Highway means.

II

Applying the definition of ''highway" froJU the Act to the
instant facts suggests that that road to Antelope Island fails
to qualify a.s a
be a

11

11

highway."

The Act provides that a road will

highway 11 only if it is

public."

11

generally open to the use of the

From the time of the first attempt at construction,

the road was washed out each year.
as much as it was open.

Indeed, it was closed about

The Appellant ignores the compelling

nature of these facts and instead argues that because the
road was open at least as often as it was closed, it·was
"generally open."

No simpl~ comparison of the number of days

the road was open to the number closed will suffice, however.
Instead, "generally open" should be given its corrunon everyday
meaning.

Emmertson v. State Tax Commission, 72 P2d 467, 470

Looking at the phrase "generally open 11 from this perspective,
it is evident that a ~oad washed out this often fails to
qualify as

11

generally open."
-5-
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The conclusion that the instant road was not

11

generally

open" is supported further by the use of the word "temporarily"
elsewhere in the statute.

As more fully detailed above, U.C.A.

41-11-49 (c) provides, "Highway shall mean .

. every way

generally open . . . notwithstanding that the same may be
temporarily closed

11

The word "temporarily" means not

of long duration, not permanent, but for a short time."
Fischer v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 225 NW2d 542, 545

To

the same effect are Worthington v. McDonald, 68 NW2d 89, 92
and Shelton

~-

Shelton, 280 SW2d 803, 805.

Since the road

to Antelope Island was closed about as often as it was open,
it can hardly be said that the closure was "not of long
duration, not permanent, but for a short time."

Thus, the

closure was more than temporary, so the instant road fails
to qualify as a "highway."
The conclusion that the road was not a "highway" is
supported by case law as well.
Louis, 3

~,10

J App.

In Armstrong v. City of St.

151, 15 7, the Court said,: !':It is a contra-

diction in terms of speak of an impassable public highway.
We might as well speak of an uninhabitable dwelling house,
or an invisible illumination.
1

11

Santoro V.. Brooks, 254 P. 1019 (Oregon) also supports

the conclusion that the instant road was not a "highway.":
This· case involved a suit in negligence for damages arising
from an automobile accident.

The negligence issue pivoted
-6-
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on whether the site of the accident was an intersection.
Under Oregon law an intersection is ''the point or place
where on highway or public way joins another at an angle.

11

Thus, to determine whether the q.cctdent occurred at an
intersection, the Court firat had to determine if there were
two "highways" coming together:.
dedicated as a "highway

11

Although one road has been

and was shown as sµch on the official

city plat, the Court held that it was not a highway for these

This st.re~t wa~ but little used and was a
dump ground for' a brqk~n-down automobile. It
was also conpidered a 'good place to pile lumber
and to -keep aand and gravel. During one per~od
in its history it was used as a cow pasture and
had been faqned to some. extent . . . (and) "was
all grown up to grass. 11 •
As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that
"This alleged. street>, under the conditions existing at the
time1 of the. accident, did not constitute a 'highway or
public yiay,

1

as

con~emplated

by O<regon Motor Ve.hicle Law."

(Ibid.)
The instant facts even more strongly than the Santoro
facts suggest that the road was not a ":highway ... because in
Santoro the road had merely fallen into disuse but remained
passable, whereas here, the road was not even passable for
several months each year . . Thus, the holding of Sant~
·
that the road was not a "highway."
supports the conclusion
-7-
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE ROAD
WAS A NEW ROAD IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
Because the original design of the road was inadequate,
it washed out annually and was under water for 4 to 6 months
at a time.

Mr. Wilson, engineer for respondent, was formerly

employed by State Highway Department as a resident engineer
and construction project engineer and was familiar with
the history of the Antelope Island Road since its desi9natLion
in 1965.

(R 62-66)

Referring to a period of time in 1965

and 1966, Mr. Wilson stated:

11

The road as attempted by the

State and County forces was not--did not--accomplish the
purpose of a road.

NanEly, it was constructed and for short

periods of time the road was open to public traffic, but
the road as constructed by the State was not substantial
enough to remain in passover condition for public traffic."
(R 69)

Referring to a period of time from 1965 forward,

Mr. Wilson went on to say:

"and it was the consensus of

that group of engineers that the section of the road was
not sufficient to, first of all, stay in place and carry
the requlring traffic loading from the mainland to the
island.

It was felt that it was not substantial.

It wasn't

constructed to the necessary typical section to remain in
place.***

And it was felt that the attempt to build the

road was, unless it was done in a proper manner, funded
-8-
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to the proper extent to build a proper road, i t would
never stay in.

It would never become a road.***

The

design and the_ construction of the road was in the beginning-·the fill slopes, the side slopes of the fille were too steep.
The width of the road where the public traveled was not wide
enough.

It was subject to erosion from wind action, wave

action, water action.

And this was later proved by the

necessity to go in and continually try to keep in in shape
such that it could carry traffic.

(R 69-72)

Exhibit 1-P indicated that the State expended about
$25,000.~00

per year commencing in 1965, to maintain the

road and in addition contracted ·for extensive repairs with
private contractors as follows:
1965
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973

$223,440.00
139,452.00
189,550.00
59,159.00
99,916.00
14 6, 35 3. 0 0
337,426.00

The annual washouts continued to occur until the road
was redesigned and rebuilt by R:espondent pursuant to contract
ip 1973 costing $2,209.627.00 (imported borrow) (and thereafter bridge structur~ work was done by Pritchett Construction
{$54,312.00 bid) and surfacing by LeGrande Johnson ($636,23i.oo
bid) . )
The new road as constructed by Respondent was significantly different from the 9ld road.

It was much wider and
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had a different configuration.

Mr. Wilson stated:

"'!'he

subbase which we constructed in some cases was as wide as
220 feet. This, plus another significant different in the
road as we constructed it was that the fill slooes were
very flat and they called them beach slopes.

It was designed

with the theory that the wave action would come up these
very flat slopes,

pie~

up the sediment, film material, and

then when the wave returnedc >back to the main body of water
it. would :·drop that seQ.irnent leave it there and hence the
road would remain in place rather than being washed out
into the lake.

11

.(R 75)

The pictures introduced into evidence by Respondent
(hearing exhibits 11-121, prints, and trail exhibits 2P-11P,
slides), illustrate the washout conditions from 1965 until
the rebuilding was done.
Based on .Mr .. Wilson's testimony, which was uncontested
both at the hearing before the State Tax Commission and at
the trial de novo, and the stipulation of the parties, the
trial Judge properly concluded that the road as constructed
by Respondent was a new road.
CONCLUSION
The review by the District Court was a trail de novo
allowing the trial Judge to make new findings, supported by
a

prepo~derance

of the evidence.
-10-
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From 1965 until the road was built by Respondent
annual attempts to construct the road failed.

Evidence

before the trial court supports the position that the
road to Antelope Island was impassable so often that
it failed to qualify as a "highway" within the meaning
of the Utah Use Fuel Tax Act.

Finally after successive

failures to build an adequate road the project was
radically redesigned and adequately funded resulting in
the construction of a new road which has withstood
the test of time.
The· judgment of the trial court ought to be
affirmed.
DATED this

day of March, 1980.

R.·espectfully r umitted,

....----/_). //__. ~
I ,)
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,,.. / /
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LA VAR E. STARK
Attorney for PlaintiffRespondent
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